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Abstract
In an endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation, we discuss the
possibility of welfare improving changes on the 1scal policy stance in some actual
economies. First, we characterize the extent to which the initial fall in revenues
produced by a permanent tax cut can be compensated by an increase in the tax base,
due to a dynamic La#er curve e#ect, showing that there is, in fact, a non-trivial
margin for substituting debt for taxes on labor and capital income. Second, we show
that the largest feasible reduction in labor income tax rates may easily produce a
higher welfare gain than the largest feasible reduction in capital income tax rates.
Two quali1cations: (a) feasible tax cuts exist only for a relatively high elasticity
of intertemporal substitution of consumption, and (b) the preference for the largest
feasible tax cut on labor income rather than that on capital income reverses for
a low appreciation for leisure, relative to consumption, in the preferences of the
representative agent. c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classi"cation: E62; O41; H30
Keywords: Endogenous growth; Human capital accumulation; La#er e#ect
1. Introduction
The object of this paper is to analyze the possible welfare gains from
substituting debt for taxes in de1cit management. Under endogenous growth,
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a reduction in a tax rate will generally have a positive and permanent impact
on the growth rate of the economy, through the incentives created for savings
and investment in either type of capital [King and Rebelo (1990), Stokey
and Rebelo (1995), Pecorino (1993, 1995), Devereux and Love (1995), and
Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998) discuss the e#ects of taxes on long-run
growth in endogenous growth models]. The tax base will eventually increase,
and it might be possible to design a de1cit 1nancing policy that reduces a tax
rate while maintaining other taxes unchanged, under which the present value
of future revenues is higher than that of future expenditures. We then say that
the tax cut is feasible. Although in a non-monetary economy it is necessary
to issue some debt to 1nance the initial de1cit produced by a feasible tax
cut, the government will be able to eventually retire it, due to this described
dynamic La7er e7ect.
Following Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988), we consider a non-monetary,
endogenous growth model with two sectors, for physical and human capital,
and no uncertainty. Human capital is accumulated with some intervention
from physical capital, while the consumption commodity is produced out
of both types of capital. The technology exhibits constant returns to scale
in both sectors. The government follows an exogenously given expenditure
path, which grows initially over time at the same rate as the economy. Public
consumption is in the form of the government retiring some output from the
economy and returning it to the consumers=workers in the form of transfers,
that they take as given. Public expenditures do not a#ect the production
technology or the marginal utility of consumers. Returning the units of good
purchased by the government to the consumers implies that a consumption
tax could also have an e#ect on long-run growth. However, for reasonable
parameterizations, the e#ect is so small that the implied increase in the tax
base is minimum, and there is no possibility of ever substituting debt for
consumption taxes. In this case, there is no dynamic La#er e#ect, and we
focus in this paper on analyzing the possibility of substituting debt for taxes
on labor and capital income. We interpret human capital as education, for
which there is no market, so the inputs used in its accumulation are not
subject to factor income taxation.
Dynamic La#er e#ects have already been studied by Ireland (1994) and
Pecorino (1995). Ireland (1994) considers an AK technology and a single tax
on output, 1nding a non-trivial range of feasible tax cuts. As in his work, we
show that feasible permanent tax cuts exist in our economy, and characterize
how the margin for reduction depends on the initial tax rates and the structural
parameters. However, a human capital accumulation economy allows us to
generalize Ireland’s analysis along some interesting lines. First, a non-trivial
transition between balanced growth paths allows us to distinguish between the
short- and long-run e#ects of a tax cut. Second, by considering di#erent tax
rates on labor and capital income, we can characterize the maximum feasible
A. Novales, J. Ruiz / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 27 (2002) 181–206 183
reduction in either one. Besides, we can discuss the normative issue of which
tax cut is preferred from the point of view of consumers’ welfare.
In a setup very similar to the one in this paper, Pecorino (1995) examines
the values of the tax rates on human capital income, physical capital income
and consumption leading to the maximum level of revenues, which amounts
to characterizing the position of the peak in La#er’s curve. Alternatively, as
in Ireland (1994), we look at a di#erent point of the curve, that corresponding
to the minimum tax rate which is able to support the exogenous stream of
Government expenditures.
With an AK technology, the economy in Ireland (1994) lacks transition
between balanced growth paths following a policy intervention. On the other
hand, Pecorino (1995) chooses not to consider the transition by character-
izing the time evolution of an economy after a change in tax policy, once
the economy is on the new balanced growth path. There are two crucial
reasons not to ignore the transition between the old and the new balanced
growth path: (1) Budget and welfare e#ects immediately following a policy
intervention may well di#er in size and even in sign from long-run e#ects.
We show that such is the case in this model, and that budget e#ects are, in
fact, di#erent when the transition is taken into account. Hence, ranking alter-
native policies may depend on whether we perform a long-run analysis, or
take into account the transition. (2) Precisely quantifying budget and welfare
e#ects crucially requires knowledge of the levels of the relevant variables.
That emerges from a full characterization of the transition, which is not easy
to make in endogenous growth models.
We focus on 1scal policies being implemented in actual economies, and
characterize the welfare implications of a tax cut. In our setup, lower taxes
imply higher welfare, so the objective will be to implement the largest feasi-
ble tax cut. Welfare e#ects can be important: when our model is calibrated to
the US economy, starting from taxes on capital and labor income of 50% and
23%, respectively (as in Cooley and Hansen, 1992), we show that the largest
feasible reduction in the labor income tax rate, to 18%, leads to a welfare
gain equivalent to that produced by augmenting consumption by 5.1% every
period. If we start from capital and labor income tax rates of 50% and 30%,
the maximum feasible cut in labor income tax rates, to 15%, produces a wel-
fare gain equivalent to an increase of 14.9% in consumption every period.
The impact of capital income tax cuts is not as large: reducing the tax rate
to its lowest feasible level of 38% produces in the 1rst case a welfare gain
equivalent to increasing consumption by 4.7% every period. In the second
case, the lowest feasible level is of 7%, and the compensation in consump-
tion should be of 12.6% every period.
These results show that there may be welfare gains to be made on 1scal
policies in actual economies, and that such gains may rely on cutting down
labor income taxes, in preference to reducing capital income tax rates.
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We describe the model economy in Section 2, while in Section 3 we
explain the type of 1scal experiments considered in the paper. In Section 4 we
discuss the short- and long-run e#ects of alternative tax cuts, paying special
attention to their impact on welfare. In Section 5 we discuss the sensitivity of
our qualitative results to alternative values of the structural parameters. The
paper closes with some conclusions.
2. The economy
The economy consists of a government, Nt identical consumers and a single
representative 1rm. The number of consumers alive each period grows at an
exogenous gross rate n; Nt = ntN0. The single consumption commodity is
produced through a constant returns to scale technology:
Yt =F(vtKt; Lt)=A(vtKt)(utHt)1− (1)
with 0¡¡ 1, where A denotes the constant level of technology and vt
is the proportion of physical capital, Kt , devoted to the production of the
consumption commodity. The total available time is normalized to one unit;
ut is the fraction of time each individual allocates to the production of the
consumption good, and Ht represents the labor ePciency units of private
agents, so that the labor input is Lt = utHt .
There is a second sector in the economy, which produces human capital in
the form of labor ePciency units. Each individual accumulates human capital
ht as
ht+1 =B[(1− vt)kt][(1− ut − wt)ht]1− + (1− h)ht; t=0; 1; 2; : : :
(2)
with 0¡¡ 1, where B is the level of technology in this sector, depreci-
ating at a constant rate h ∈ (0; 1). We assume that there is no market for
human capital. E#ective physical capital stock used in the production of hu-
man capital by each individual is (1 − vt)kt; e#ective units of labor used
in the production of human capital are (1 − ut − wt)ht , where wt denotes
the fraction of time that agents devote to leisure. Throughout the paper,
except for fractions of time denoted by ut and wt , or fractions of capi-
tal, like vt , lower case letters denote per capita variables, while the analog
capital letters denote aggregate variables. The produced commodity can ei-
ther be consumed or accumulated as physical capital, which depreciates at
a constant rate k ∈ (0; 1). Per capita physical capital accumulates over time
according to
nkt+1 = it + (1− k)kt ; t=0; 1; 2; : : : ; (3)
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where it denotes the per capita resources devoted in the economy to gross
investment, i.e., the units of output which are not consumed:
ct + [nkt+1 − (1− k)kt]=A(vtkt)(utht)1−; (4)
where ct denotes per capita private consumption. This is the global constraint
of resources in the economy.
Each individual in the economy derives utility from consuming ct units
of the single physical commodity, as well as from enjoying leisure time,
wt . Preferences are characterized by a constant relative risk aversion utility
function
U (ct ; wt)=
(cpt w
1−p
t )1− − 1
1−  ; ¿ 0; 0¡p¡ 1:
Interpreting the product inside the bracket as a single, composite commod-
ity, the coePcient of relative risk aversion is equal to  and the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution of consumption of the composite good is 1=.
Together with the constant returns to scale technologies assumed in the two
sectors, this utility function satis1es the conditions for endogenous growth in
King et al. (1988).
The representative consumer can save in the form of physical capital or
government debt, bt . He=she takes tax rates, government transfers, factor
rental prices, and the real return on bonds as given, and chooses sequences for
{ct ; ut ; vt ; wt ; kt+1; ht+1; bt+1}∞t=0 to maximize discounted time aggregate utility.
He=she faces the sequence of single period budget constraints
nkt+1 + n
bt+1
Rt
+ ct + (rt − k) rt vtkt +  !t !tutht
≤ rtvtkt +!tutht + (1− k)kt + bt + gt; t=1; 2; 3; : : : ; (5)
which includes rtvtkt as income received from renting physical capital to the
1rms producing the consumption commodity, where rt is the rental price of
capital, as well as !tutht , as income from supplying ePcient units of labor
at a salary !t . His=her stock of human capital, ht , has been accumulated
over time by devoting part of his time and physical capital to the educational
sector. He=she receives transfers from the government, gt , as well as the
return from the discount bonds, bt , which were bought the previous period.
This total income is used to purchase ct units of the consumption commodity,
nkt+1 − (1 − k)kt units of physical capital, and nbt+1=Rt discount bonds at
a price 1=Rt , which pay a certain return Rt in the next period. He=she also
pays (rt − ) rt vtkt +  !t !tutht as taxes, where  !;  r denote, respectively, the
tax rates on income from e#ective labor and income from renting the stock
of physical capital, where we allow for depreciation allowances. We take the
initial stocks of debt, physical and human capital, b0; k0; h0, as given.
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The utility maximization problem of an in1nitely lived dynasty is
MAX
{ct ;ut ;vt ;wt ; kt+1 ;ht+1 ;bt+1}
∞∑
t=0
#t
(cpt w
1−p
t )1− − 1
1−  Nt; ¿ 0; 0¡#¡ 1 (6)
subject to (2) and (5), given h0; k0; b0, with kt ; ct ; ht ≥ 0, vt ; ut ; wt ∈ (0; 1) and
ut + wt ∈ (0; 1) for all t, with 0¡#¡ 1 being the time discount factor.
First order conditions for this problem are, for each t=0; 1; 2; 3; : : : ,
(1−  !t )!t
(1−  rt )rt +  rt k
=
1− 

1− vt
1− ut − wt
kt
ht
; (7)
p
1− pwt =
1
(1−  !t )!t
ct
ht
; (8)
cp(1−)−1t w
(1−)(1−p)
t =#c
p(1−)−1
t+1 w
(1−p)(1−)
t+1 [(1−  rt+1)(rt+1 − k) + 1];
(9)
cp(1−)−1t w
(1−p)(1−)
t
(1− vt)(1− ut − wt)−(kt=ht) (1−  
!
t )!t
=#n
cp(1−)−1t+1 w
(1−p)(1−)
t+1
(1− vt+1)(1− ut+1 − wt+1)−(kt+1=ht+1)
×(1−  !t+1)!t+1[(1− )B(1− vt+1)(1− ut+1 − wt+1)−
×(kt+1=ht+1)(1− wt+1) + 1− h]; (10)
cp(1−)−1t w
(1−)(1−p)
t =#c
p(1−)−1
t+1 w
(1−p)(1−)
t+1 Rt; (11)
together with (5) and the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞ n
t kt+1 + bt+1=Rt∏t−1
s=0 Rs
=0; lim
t→∞%tht+1 =0; (12)
where %t is the Lagrange multiplier associated to (2), with the standard inter-
pretation of setting after-tax marginal rates of substitution and transformation
equal to relative prices. According to (12), the aggregate stocks of physical
capital and debt do not accumulate over time at a rate faster than Rt=n. From
(9) and (11), the equilibrium rate of return on bonds is
Rt =(1−  rt+1)rt+1 + [1− k(1−  rt+1)]; (13)
which implies that the discount rate at which bonds are issued is equal, in
equilibrium, to the rental rate on physical capital paid by the 1rm to the
consumers, net of taxes and depreciation.
The single 1rm producing the consumption good operates in perfectly com-
petitive markets for its product, as well as for the two production factors,
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labor and physical capital. Pro1t-maximizing behavior leads to paying each
factor its marginal product:
!t =FLt (t)= (1− )A(utht)−(vtkt); t=0; 1; 2; 3; : : : ; (14)
rt =FKt (t)= A(utht)
1−(vtkt)−1; t=0; 1; 2; 3; : : : : (15)
The government gives each period an income transfer gt to each consumer,
which is 1nanced by taxes on labor and capital income, as well as by issuing
debt. These transfers do not have any impact on the technology available to
the 1rm, or on marginal utility. Its single period budget constraint is, in per
capita terms,
gt + bt ≤  rt (rt − k)vtkt +  !t !tutht + n
bt+1
Rt
; t=0; 1; 2; : : : ; (16)
where bt denotes the per-capita stock of debt available at time t.
Given {gt;  rt ;  !t }∞t=0 and k0, h0, b0, a competitive equilibrium is a set of
trajectories {ct ; kt+1; ht+1; bt+1; ut ; vt ; wt ; rt ; !t; Rt}∞t=0 such that: (a) given {rt ; !t;
Rt}∞t=0, {ct ; ut ; vt ; wt ; kt+1; ht+1; bt+1}∞t=0 solves the dynasty optimization prob-
lem, (b) given {rt ; !t}∞t=0, {utht ; kt}∞t=0 solves the 1rm’s pro1t maximization
problem, (c) (5) and (16) hold, and all markets clear, i.e.: (i) (4) holds, so
that consumption plus investment is equal in each period to total production,
(ii) the demand for bonds by consumers is equal to the supply of debt is-
sued by the government, (iii) the demand for physical capital input by the
1rm is equal to the supply devoted to that activity by consumers, and (iv)
the demand for labor input is equal to the supply of labor ePcient units.
In equilibrium, the marginal rate of transformation of physical capital and
labor must be the same in the two sectors, the marginal product of e#ective
labor is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure, and the marginal product of physical capital is equal to the marginal
rate of substitution over time, in all cases after appropriately correcting for
tax e#ects.
A balanced growth path is a solution {ct ; kt+1; ht+1; bt+1; ut ; vt ; wt ; rt ; !t; Rt}
to optimization problem (6), subject to (2) and (5), for initial conditions k0,
h0, b0, such that {ct ; ht ; kt} grows at a constant rate &∗, and {ut; vt ; wt; !t; rt},
as well as the capital-to-output ratio, stay constant. Values along the balanced
growth path for u∗; v∗; w∗; r∗; !∗; &∗; (kt=ht)∗, and (ct=ht)∗ can be obtained, for
a given parameterization, from the utility and pro1t maximizing conditions
(7)–(10), (14), (15), together with (2) and (4), a system of eight equations in
as many variables. Then, (13) and (16) provide us with the balanced growth
path values for R∗ and bt . At a di#erence of the other variables, the stock
of debt does not remain constant along the balanced growth path, even after
normalization by the stock of human capital. The value of &∗, the growth
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rate of the economy along the balance growth path, depends in a complex
manner on all structural parameters, as well as on tax rates.
3. Financing a reduction in tax rates
We take as benchmark a situation in which the government balances its
budget each period, so that debt has never been issued, bt =0 ∀t. We also
assume that tax rates on consumption, labor and capital income have been
constant at predetermined values,  jt =  
j
0 ∀t; j= r; !.
Let us denote the initial stocks of physical and human capital as k0;0, h0;0,
where the 1rst subindex refers to time, while the second denotes that we
are in the baseline case. We additionally suppose that these quantities are in
their balanced growth proportion, k0;0=h0;0 = (kt;0=ht;0)∗. Since the government
is not issuing any debt in the baseline case, we will have, at time zero,
b0;0 = 0, and the government budget constraint will hold if expenditures are
given by
g0;0 =  r0v
∗
0k0;0(r
∗
0 − k) +  !0!∗0u∗0h0;0 (17)
which amounts to
gt;0 =  r0v
∗
0kt;0(r
∗
0 − k) +  !0!∗0u∗0ht;0 ∀t; xt;0 = &∗0x0;0; x= g; k; h:
In the absence of any structural change, the economy would stay on its
balanced growth path, kt;0; ht;0; ct;0 growing over time at a constant rate &∗0 ,
the same for all of them, while ut;0; vt;0; wt;0; rt;0; Rt;0; !t;0 would remain con-
stant at their steady-state values u∗0 ; v
∗
0 ; w
∗
0 ; r
∗
0 ; R
∗
0 ; !
∗
0 , which are determined
simultaneously with &∗0 . We assume that gt;0 also grows at a rate &
∗
0 so that
there will never be any need to issue debt, and a budget constraint like (17)
will hold in every time period.
From this situation, let us suppose that the government considers a perma-
nent reduction in a single tax rate, keeping the other tax rate unchanged and
government transfers on their previously planned path gt;0 = (&∗0)
tg0;0. Need-
less to say, in a non-monetary economy that will need issuing of some debt,
which might hopefully be retired over time. On the other hand, a tax cut will
generally produce an increase in the long-run growth rate of the economy,
thereby increasing the tax base, which might lead to higher revenues at some
point. We say that a reduction in a given tax rate is feasible if the subse-
quent increase in the tax base allows for the government budget constraint
to hold in a present value sense. That would mean that the bigger de1cit in
the initial periods after the policy change can be repaid by achieving later a
1scal surplus higher in present value than that under the initial policy. That
will allow for eventually retiring the initially issued debt, without having to
introduce tax hikes at any point in time. This may be possible only because
government expenditures continue to grow at a rate &∗0 after the tax cut.
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As an illustration, let us suppose that at a time we denote as t=0 for no-
tational convenience, the government implements a reduction in labor income
taxes, from  !0 to  
!
1 ,  
!
1 ¡ 
!
0 . This will have a positive e#ect on the long-run
growth rate of the economy, as well as short-run e#ects on all the relevant
variables, since transitional dynamics are non-trivial in this economy.
Let us denote by revt;1 the per-capita, period t, tax revenues under the
reduced labor income tax  !1 :
revt;1 =  r0vt;1kt;1(rt;1 − k) +  !1!t;1ut;1; ht;1; t=0; 1; 2; : : : ; (18)
so that from (16) the government budget constraint is
(revt;1 − gt;0) + nbt+1;1Rt;1 − bt;1 ≥ 0; t=0; 1; 2; : : : (19)
with b0;1 = 0, where we maintain the same expenditure path as before the tax
cut, gt;0. After the policy intervention, physical and human capital, as well
as consumption will start growing at a rate di#erent from &∗0 . Growth rates
along the transition will generally di#er for these three variables, although
they will converge to a new, common long-run growth rate, &∗1 .
Using the transversality condition (12), together with the initial condition
b0;1 = 0, (19) can be solved further as
(rev0;1 − g0;0) +
∞∑
t=1
(
t−1∏
s=0
Rs;1
)−1
nt(revt;1 − gt;0) ≥ 0 (20)
or, equivalently,
rev0;1 +
∞∑
t=1
(
t−1∏
s=0
Rs;1
)−1
nt revt;1
− g0;0

1 + ∞∑
t=1
(
t−1∏
s=0
Rs;1
)−1
(n&∗0)
t

 ≥ 0; (21)
since gt;0 = (&∗0)
tg0;0. This inequality characterizes the time paths of revenues,
expenditures and interest rates which are consistent with a feasible tax reduc-
tion (there will be a similar expression for each tax rate that can be reduced).
If the strict inequality holds, the debt which is initially issued is eventually
retired, and the government runs a present value surplus that could be re-
turned as an additional transfer to consumers. In most cases, the time path
for debt starts increasing very quickly after the tax cut, eventually reaching a
maximum and going to zero after a 1nite (although possibly large) number
of periods. That bt eventually becomes negative in those cases means that
with the lower tax rate, the government can actually 1nance a higher level of
expenditures than it could with the initial, higher tax rate. When (21) holds
as an equality, the implied debt path grows without bound at a rate R∗1 =n.
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In all cases, the growth rate of the capital stock converges to &∗1 , which is
strictly less than R∗1 =n under the parameterizations we use. As a consequence,
since b0 = 0, the transversality condition holds. This is the only case in which
the stock of debt does not go to zero in any 1nite time. If (21) does not
hold, the stock of bonds explodes at a rate larger than R∗1 =n, violating the
transversality condition, and the tax cut is unfeasible.
A cut in either labor or capital income tax rates a#ects the rate of growth
of the economy, the marginal product of capital and the rate of return on
bonds, so there are extensive e#ects on (21), and the behavior along the
transition of all the variables in (21) becomes crucial to discuss feasibility.
This is more general than the analysis in Ireland (1994), where an economy
without transition between balanced growth paths is considered. The e#ects
along the transition may reinforce the long-run e#ects, if they have the same
sign, or compensate them, if they are of opposite sign. Characterizing that is
an important component of our analysis.
To numerically evaluate (21), we assume that after 250 periods the econ-
omy is close enough to the new balanced growth path so that (21) can be
approximated by
rev0;1 +
250∑
t=1
(n&∗1)
t∏t−1
s=0 Rs;1
revt;1 + rev∗1 R
∗
1
(n&∗1 =R
∗
1)
251
1− (n&∗1 =R∗1)
− g0;0
[
1 +
250∑
t=1
(n&∗0)
t∏t−1
s=0 Rs;1
+ R∗1
(n&∗0 =R
∗
1)
251
1− (n&∗0 =R∗1)
]
≥ 0; (22)
where asterisks denote values along the new balanced growth path. To obtain
(22) we have used the fact that n&∗1 =R
∗
1 is less than 1, which guarantees that
the transversality condition holds and that the objective function is bounded.
The competitive equilibrium of the economy solves the system of equa-
tions (2), (5), (7)–(10) and (13)–(16), 10 non-linear di#erence equations
in (ct ; kt+1; ht+1; ut ; wt; vt ; Rt ; !t; rt ; bt) with k0, h0 as initial conditions, together
with transversality conditions (12), for given paths of the policy variables
{ !t ;  rt ; gt}, t=0; 1; 2; 3; : : : . To compute the numerical solution, we apply the
procedure in Sims (1999) and Novales et al. (1999), based on the eigenvalue–
eigenvector decomposition of the system, written in ratios and linearized
around the balanced growth path to compute in this case two stability con-
ditions. To actually produce equilibrium time series along the transition we
substitute the two stability conditions for (9) and (10), the two Euler con-
ditions relating variables in t with variables in t + 1. This guarantees that
the trajectories we obtain for the variables above will satisfy transversality
conditions (12). The linear approximation is used just to compute the stabil-
ity conditions, but not to generate the set of equilibrium time series, which
are calculated from the original system of non-linear di#erence equations de-
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scribed above. These time paths can be obtained independent of the debt
sequence, which is later obtained from (16).
4. Substituting debt for taxes: Long- and short-run e ects
4.1. Taxes and long-run growth
We start by analyzing the long-run budget and growth e#ects of reducing
taxes, which is needed to fully understand the consequences of changing a
given tax structure over the lifetime of the representative private agent. We
use as a benchmark parameterization
=1:5; #=0:99; A=1:0; =0:36; B=0:039670; 1− k =0:975;
1− h=0:992; n=1:0035; =0:15; p=1=3;  r =0:50;  !=0:23
and we interpret the time unit as one quarter. This parameterization places
the economy in the normal case, following the terminology in Caball'e and
Santos (1993). The relative risk aversion parameter is inside the wide range
usually considered in the literature. The 0.36 share of physical capital in
the production of the consumption good is standard, while we have chosen
a lower share, of 0.15, for this input in the technology of human capital
accumulation. Given the lack of empirical evidence on structural parameters
in the human capital sector, it seems reasonable to assume that human capital
accumulation is less intensive in physical capital than the production of the
consumption commodity, and substantially more intensive in human than in
physical capital. The relative weight of consumption in the utility function has
been chosen so that, under the assumed tax rates, the fraction of time devoted
to the production of consumption goods along the balanced growth path is
around 0.20, in line with the values usually reported for the US economy
(see for instance, Gomme, 1993).
Tax rates on labor and capital income are as in Cooley and Hansen (1992).
The implied annual real rate of return on physical capital is 5.5%, and the
economy grows along its balanced growth path at a quarterly gross rate of
&0 = 1:00365, as in Gomme (1993), i.e., annual growth under this benchmark
policy is 1.47%.
As shown in Table 1, along the balanced growth path corresponding to
this parameterization, consumers devote 58% of their time to leisure, 20%
to producing the consumption good and 22% to human capital accumula-
tion. This sector also absorbs 26.7% of the stock of physical capital, while
the remaining 73.3% is devoted to producing the consumption good. Invest-
ment in physical capital represents 29.4% of the output, while consumption
amounts to the remaining 70.6%. The government is raising 24.4% of the
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Table 1
Steady-state values of relevant variables for di#erent tax structures
 r =0:50;  r =0:50;  r =0:43;  r =0:50;  r =0:50;  r =0:43;
 !=0:23  !=0:20  !=0:23  !=0:30  !=0:27  !=0:30
Leisure: wt 0.5766 0.5624 0.5690 0.6021 0.5869 0.5946
Working time: ut 0.2011 0.2049 0.2030 0.1890 0.1931 0.1909
Human capital accumulation time: 0.2222 0.2326 0.2280 0.2089 0.2200 0.2145
1− ut − wt
Proportion of physical capital in the 0.7328 0.7184 0.7421 0.7511 0.7357 0.7598
commodity sector: vt
Physical capital devoted to human capital 0.2672 0.2816 0.2579 0.2489 0.2643 0.2402
accumulation: 1− vt
Consumption=output: ct=yt 0.7064 0.7025 0.6907 0.7135 0.7098 0.6979
Investment in physical capital=output: it =yt 0.2936 0.2975 0.3093 0.2865 0.2902 0.3021
Consumption=augmented output 0.4305 0.4173 0.4182 0.4509 0.4365 0.4383
Investment in physical capital=augmented 0.1790 0.1767 0.1873 0.1810 0.1785 0.1897
output
Investment in human capital=augmented 0.3905 0.4061 0.3944 0.3681 0.3850 0.3720
output
Public revenues=output 0.2436 0.2264 0.2261 0.2884 0.2714 0.2709
Quarterly growth 1.00365 1.00421 1.00400 1.00366 1.00429 1.00401
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output as revenues. Augmented output is obtained adding to produced output
the cross-product of human capital investment and the relative shadow price
of both types of capital. The second and third columns in Table 1 consider
alternative tax cuts in labor and capital income, respectively, which will be
analyzed in the next sections. Under our benchmark parameterization, these
cuts produce a similar fall in revenues, as a percentage of the output. The
remaining three columns allow for analyzing the e#ects of similar tax cuts,
starting from a higher labor income tax rate.
A labor tax induces a shift from working time to leisure and leads to
substituting physical capital for labor in the production of the consumption
good. It also discourages human capital accumulation, since it is being taxed
as an input in the production sector. Less hours are devoted to learning, and
a lower proportion of physical capital is used to accumulate human capital.
A capital income tax induces a shift from physical to human capital in the
production of the consumption commodity. A higher proportion of physical
capital is devoted to human capital accumulation, leading to the desired sub-
stitution between inputs in production. Transferring resources between sectors
as a response to a capital income tax allows for a smaller distortion than un-
der a labor income tax of the same size. Besides, the distortions produced
by a labor income tax on the allocation of time among its di#erent uses, as
well as on the split of physical capital between the two sectors, are bigger
than those of a capital income tax of the same size, which is a second reason
explaining the fact that the e#ect on growth of a labor income tax is more
important.
E#ects of opposite sign arise under tax cuts. For our parameterization,
it is the amount of time devoted to human capital accumulation which is
strongly stimulated by a cut in labor income taxes, while the e#ect on hours
devoted to producing the consumption commodity is relatively minor. Besides,
the percentage of physical capital allocated to the educational sector also
increases, so that there are two reasons why human capital accumulation
accelerates, and it is through this double e#ect that the rate of growth of the
economy increases. Long-run e#ects on the steady-state allocation of time
following a reduction in capital income tax rates go in the same direction
as those arising after a comparable labor income tax cut, but they are much
smaller. Contrary to the result under a payroll tax cut, the proportion of
physical capital devoted to human capital accumulation now decreases. In
the face of a capital income tax cut, it is this shift of resources out of human
capital accumulation and into the production of the consumption good, that
creates a smaller stimulus on growth than a similar cut on labor income taxes.
Fig. 1a shows, for our parameterization, that annual growth in our model
economy uniformly increases from its benchmark value of 1.47% when taxes
on labor income or capital income decrease. Tax cuts in the graph are bounded
by the initial levels of the tax rates. Payroll taxes have a much bigger per
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Fig. 1. (a) and (b) show annual growth and the ratio of public revenues to output, respectively,
as a function of each possible tax cut. (c) shows annual growth as a function of the implied
public revenues=output ratio. Starting tax rates:  !=0:23;  r =0:50.
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unit impact on long-term growth, so a much larger tax cut on capital income
than on labor income can be implemented before a given loss of revenue, as
a percentage of output, arises (Fig. 1b). This is due to the fact that capital
income is a smaller base than labor income. In spite of that, since the per
unit distortion of capital income taxes on growth is small, a cut in payroll
taxes turns out also to be a much better stimulus for growth than the cut in
capital income taxes that would produce the same fall in the revenue=output
ratio (Fig. 1c).
Starting from  r0 = 0:50,  
!
0 = 0:23, a 0.10 cut in labor income tax rates, to
 !1 = 0:13, while maintaining capital income tax rates unchanged, would bring
the revenue=output ratio down to 0.186, from its starting value of 0.244. A
similar fall in the public revenues to output ratio would be produced by a cut
of 0.26 in the tax rate on capital income, to  r1 = 0:24. They would lead to an
increase in the long-run annual growth rates from 1.47% for the initial tax
rates, to 2.20% and 1.93%, respectively, so the di#erences can be substantial.
Long-run e#ects of a feasible tax cut on consumers’ utility are parallel to
those on growth, increasing with the size of the reduction in the tax rate.
The reason is that the higher growth implied by lower taxes will allow for
the consumption and the single period utility level to also grow in the long
run faster than before the tax cut. E#ects on the initial periods, i.e., the tran-
sitional dynamics, are less obvious: on the one hand, lower taxes will leave
more resources available for consumption; on the other hand, consumers will
have to acquire the debt which is issued at the time of the tax cut, reducing
available resources. The set of equilibrium conditions already shows that all
variables will be a#ected by a tax cut in a non-trivial manner, making it
impossible to analytically characterize the sign of the short-run utility e#ects.
A numerical discussion of their importance is the purpose of the next section.
4.2. Feasible tax cuts
While the responses of the main variables to a reduction in labor income
taxes is roughly constant over time, important di#erences can be seen between
short- and long-run e#ects following a tax cut on the cumulative factor, phys-
ical capital. After a reduction from  r0 = 0:50 to  
r
1 = 0:43 when  
!=0:23, the
fraction of time devoted to production immediately jumps by 6% (not shown
in the paper), then decreasing to stabilize around a gain of just 0.9%, as re-
Sected in Table 1. Leisure immediately decreases by 0.4%, falling over time
for a steady-state reduction of 1.3%. The time devoted to accumulate human
capital immediately falls by 4.3%, recovering to stabilize at 2.7% above its
initial level. Ignoring these transitional dynamics would a#ect the quantitative
results signi1cantly, potentially biasing the results of our policy analysis.
In what follows, the parameter values are as in Section 4.1, except for
B=0:042818 when  r0 = 0:50,  
!
0 = 0:30 which is the alternative tax vector
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we will consider in our policy analysis. This change in B guarantees that
the annual growth remains at 1.47%, as in Gomme (1993). Fig. 2 presents
the e#ects on the budget of a permanent reduction on either labor (upper
panel) or capital income tax rates (lower panel), starting from  r0 = 0:50 and
either  !0 = 0:23 (left side) or  
!
0 = 0:30 (right side). The horizontal axis shows
the size of the tax cut. The value of the left-hand side in (22) under a
reduction in one of the tax rates is shown on the left vertical axis, under
the Budget e7ect label. Positive values associated to small tax cuts mean
that a small reduction in the tax rate stimulates growth suPciently such that
a future higher tax base compensates for the permanent reduction in the
tax rate. Negative values farther away from the origin mean that the initial
de1cit produced by bigger tax cuts cannot possibly be compensated in the
present value government budget constraint with future tax revenues without
any further 1scal adjustment. The right axis shows the long-run e#ects on
quarterly growth, measured by the absolute di#erence between the growth
rates before and after the tax cut.
The upper panel shows that the tax rate on labor income can be reduced
by up to 0.05 from its benchmark level of  !0 = 0:23, down to  
!
1 = 0:18. The
implied increase on the quarterly growth rate, shown on the right axis, is up
to 0.092 under the maximum feasible cut, the annual growth increasing from
1.47% to 1.84%. A bigger tax cut would violate the present value government
budget constraint, while a lower tax cut would produce a time-aggregate,
present value government surplus.
The higher the initial tax rate, the bigger the margin for feasible reductions.
When  !0 = 0:30, the feasible range for labor income tax rates is (0.15, 0.30)
versus the (0.18,0.23) feasible range when  !0 = 0:23. Cutting the tax rate
down to  !1 = 0:15 would produce an increase in the quarterly growth rate of
0.28, so that annual growth would rise from 1.47% to 2.61%.
There are two lines in the lower panel graphs showing the Budget e7ect,
since not including the transition between balanced growth paths in the anal-
ysis of capital income tax cuts makes a di#erence. Taking into account the
transition, and starting from a tax rate of  !0 = 0:23 on labor income, the tax
rate on capital income can be reduced by up to 0.12 from its benchmark
level of  r0 = 0:50, down to  
r
1 = 0:38. For this minimum feasible value, the
quarterly growth rate would increase by 0.056, the annual growth moving
from 1.47% to 1.70%. When the tax rate on labor income is  !0 = 0:30, the
tax on capital income can be reduced by up to 0.43, to a minimum feasible
value of  r1 = 0:07. The maximum increase in the quarterly growth rate would
be 0.17, which would bring the annual growth from its initial value of 1.47%
to 2.16%.
Ignoring the transition would have led us to believe that, for  !0 = 0:30, the
maximum feasible cut in the capital income is from  r0 = 0:50 to  
r
1 = 0:16
with an increase in the annual growth from 1.47% to 2.05%, versus the
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Fig. 2. Growth and budget e#ects of a tax cut. Each graph presents the e#ects of a tax cut on the present value government budget and on
long-run quarterly growth. The budget e#ect, not including the transition, is also shown, for comparison. Upper panel: labor income tax cut.
Lower panel: capital income tax cut.
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Fig. 3. The upper graph shows the range of feasible tax rates on capital income as a function
of their initial level, for tax rates on labor income of either  !=0:23 or 0.30. The lower graph
shows the range of feasible tax rates on labor income for a starting tax rate on capital income:
 r =0:50.
actual possibility of bringing down capital income taxes to  r1 = 0:07, with an
annual growth of 2.16%. For other parameterizations, ignoring the transition
would have led us to believe that the largest feasible capital income tax
cut is bigger than it actually is. In any event, the quantitative results of a
pure long-run analysis of the e#ects of changes in tax rates as well as the
numerical characterization of their feasible range could be rather misleading.
Fig. 3 shows the feasible range of capital and labor income tax rates. The
upper graph shows the feasible range for capital income taxes, as a function
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of their starting level both, when the labor income tax rate is  !0 = 0:23,
and when it is  !0 = 0:30. Any capital income tax rate which is feasible for
 !0 = 0:23, is also feasible for  
!
0 = 0:30. For  
!
0 = 0:23, capital income taxes
cannot be reduced at all if  r0¡ 0:42. When  
!
0 = 0:30, no capital income tax
cuts are feasible unless  r0 is above 0.23. The lower graph shows the feasible
range for labor income tax rates when  r0 = 0:50, which is consistent with the
maximum feasible reductions discussed above for  !0 = 0:30 and 0.23. There
are no feasible reductions in labor income taxes if  !0 ¡ 0:20.
4.3. Welfare e7ects
Consumption decreases following a cut in either labor or capital income tax
rates. The fall in consumption is particularly signi1cant after a capital income
tax cut, since there is then an important stimulus to build-up physical capital.
We have already discussed that leisure also decreases after either tax cut, so
it is clear that utility falls immediately after a tax cut of either kind. Under
a labor income tax cut, the lower utility is mainly due to the fall in leisure,
while under a capital income tax cut, both the inputs contribute to the loss
of utility. However, the negative e#ect of the tax cut on single period utility
gets smaller, eventually becoming positive in such a way that the long-run
e#ect dominates and the time aggregate welfare is always higher after a tax
cut. Besides, the welfare gain increases with the size of the tax cut.
With  !0 = 0:23, the largest feasible reduction in labor income taxes to
 !1 = 0:18 leads to an increase in welfare equal to that produced by a per-
manent increase in consumption of 5.1%, while the largest feasible cut in
capital income taxes from  !1 = 0:50 to 0.38 amounts to a permanent increase
in consumption of 4.7%. Welfare gains increase when the benchmark tax
rate on labor income is  !0 = 0:30. A cut to the lowest feasible level of the
labor income tax rate, of  !1 = 0:15, would produce a welfare gain equiv-
alent to a permanent increase in consumption of 14.9% every quarter. On
the other hand, a cut to the lowest feasible level of the capital income tax
rate,  r1 = 0:07, while maintaining the labor income tax at  
!
0 = 0:30 would be
welfare-equivalent to an increase of 12.6% in consumption every period.
Our results do not have much bearing on the optimal 1scal policy, but they
are very relevant to characterize welfare-improving interventions on 1scal
structures similar to those observed in actual economies. We have shown
that from a somewhat standard 1scal stance, the welfare gain produced by
lowering taxes on labor income is bigger than that produced by a similar cut
in capital income taxes. Furthermore, under our parameterization, reducing
the labor income tax rate to its lowest feasible level while leaving taxes on
capital income unchanged leads to a bigger welfare gain than reducing the
capital income tax rate to its lowest feasible level.
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Qualitative results concerning the range of feasible tax rates do not change
for di#erent values of most structural parameters, like depreciation rates of
physical and human capital or population growth. However, other parameters
are crucial for these results, as we will see next.
5. Sensitivity analysis
To discuss the relevance of the main structural parameters on our previous
results, Fig. 4 shows the budget and growth e#ects of a reduction in the tax
rate on labor income from  !0 = 0:23 to  
!
1 = 0:20 or, alternatively, a tax cut on
capital income from  r0 = 0:50 to  
r
1 = 0:43. As already mentioned, these cuts
produce a similar fall in long-run government revenues, as a proportion of
output, and any other pair of comparable cuts should be expected to produce
similar qualitative results. Each graph changes the value of one structural
parameter, to characterize the range of values for which feasible tax cuts
exist. Since we maintain the other parameters at their benchmark values,
long-run growth prior to any tax cut changes with the structural parameter
under consideration and the right axes shows absolute di#erences in quarterly
growth before and after the tax cuts.
For small values of A, tax cuts will have a minor impact on growth, and
the tax base will barely increase over time, without any possibility of ever
compensating the de1cit initially produced by the tax cut (upper left graph).
For A below 0.54, the proposed tax cuts are not feasible. For A between
0.54 and 0.64, it is possible to 1nance the labor income tax cut, but not the
proposed capital income tax cut, while for A greater than 0.64, both tax cuts
can be 1nanced. In this analysis, the value of B is maintained constant, so
that long-run growth prior to any tax cut increases with A. For A=1, we have
the e#ect on growth under our benchmark parameterization: annual growth
would increase from 1.47% to 1.70% under the proposed labor income tax
cut, and to 1.61% under the proposed capital income tax cut. The capital
income tax cut would increase growth from 0.87% to 0.99% when A=0:7,
or from 3.14% to 3.32% when A=2:4. The proposed labor income tax cut
would increase growth from 0.87% to 1.08% when A=0:7, or from 3.14%
to 3.41% when A=2:4.
Either tax cut would have an important impact on growth if the elasticity
of physical capital in the commodity sector, , was close to 0.50 or higher,
so substituting debt for taxes in that economy would be very advantageous
(graph not shown). For the proposed tax cuts to be feasible, this elasticity
must be above =0:31. Substitution of debt for taxes is also feasible in an
economy in which the human capital accumulation technology is somewhat
intensive in physical capital. The proposed tax cut on labor income is feasible
for ¿ 0:11, while the proposed cut on capital income taxes is feasible for
¿ 0:12 (upper right graph).
A
.
N
ovales,
J.
R
uiz
/Journalof
E
conom
ic
D
ynam
ics
&
C
ontrol
27
(2002)
181–206
201
Fig. 4. Budget and growth e#ects of alternative tax cuts on capital and labor income. Initial tax rates:  r0 = 0:50,  
!
0 = 0:23. Alternative 1nal tax
rates:  r1 = 0:43;  
!
1 = 0:23 and  
r
1 = 0:50,  
!
1 = 0:20. These tax cuts generate the same long-run fall in public revenues as a percentage of output.
Budget(tax(w)); Budget(tax(r)) show the budget e#ects following the proposed cuts in labor and capital income, respectively. Growth(tax(w))
and Growth(tax(r)) show the absolute long-run e#ects on quarterly growth.
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A given tax cut is easier to 1nance for low degrees of relative risk aver-
sion, i.e., for high values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption of the composite good (lower left graph). With a high elasticity
of substitution, i.e., a close to linear utility function, consumers are glad to
substitute future for current consumption, to take advantage of a permanently
higher long-run growth. In spite of the negative initial e#ect on utility, these
consumers keep accumulating physical and human capital, implying robust
long-run growth. Therefore, these consumers will tend to be more in favor of
a given tax cut, since they are relatively indi#erent with respect to the timing
of consumption.
On the contrary, consumers with a low elasticity of substitution, i.e., with
a high relative risk aversion, will desire to smooth their consumption=leisure
path, devoting relatively more resources to current consumption and leisure
in detriment of physical and human capital accumulation, with a negative
impact on future growth. As a consequence, the positive long-run e#ect on
growth of any tax cut will be smaller, and it will be harder to 1nance. For
our benchmark parameterization, the proposed tax cuts are not feasible for
 above 1.6, i.e., for an elasticity of intertemporal substitution below 0.63,
which includes values which are sometimes considered in theoretical and
empirical studies. However, some tax cuts, smaller than those considered in
Fig. 4, would still be feasible for ¿ 1:6. On the other hand, the tax cuts in
Fig. 4 would be feasible for some values of  above 1.6, provided we started
from suPciently higher initial tax rates. Finally, maintaining the benchmark
values of all parameters except , there would not be any feasible tax for
¿ 1:8.
The proposed tax cut on capital income is easier to implement in economies
where leisure is more important, relative to consumption, in the preferences
of the representative agent (lower right graph). For low values of p, con-
sumption is relatively less important, and it can decrease further, to provide
for physical capital accumulation. That would lead to higher growth, although
there is a compensating e#ect from the strong initial fall in the hours devoted
to learning. The graph shows that growth is only slightly increasing in 1−p,
and even decreasing for high values of 1−p. A similar comment applies to
a labor income tax cut, except that then there is no reduction in the hours of
learning. The growth and budget e#ects are increasing in 1−p on a plausible
range of values, making it easier to eventually 1nance any tax cut. For values
of 1− p above 0.64, both the proposed tax cuts are feasible. For 1− p be-
tween 0.62 and 0.64, the proposed capital income tax cut can be 1nanced, but
not the labor income tax cut. None of the proposed tax cuts can be 1nanced
for 1− p below 0.62.
As the time discount factor increases consumers become more patient, be-
ing more willing to substitute future for current consumption, and devoting
more resources to accumulate physical and human capital after a tax cut. That
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Fig. 5. W -tax(r) and W -tax(!) denote the welfare e#ects of the maximum feasible tax cuts,
as a function of p: g-tax(r) and g-tax(!) denote their e#ects on quarterly growth.
produces a bigger impact on long-run growth, making it easier to 1nance the
initial fall in revenues. For # above 0.989, the proposed tax cuts are feasible.
A high depreciation in either physical or human capital renders the corre-
sponding factor obsolete very quickly, demanding a large amount of resources
to sustain long-run growth, which makes it harder to 1nance a given tax cut.
The proposed tax cut on capital income becomes feasible for a depreciation
rate on physical capital less than 4.2% (annual depreciation below 15.8%:
1 − (1 − )4 =0:842) while the cut on labor income taxes is feasible for a
depreciation rate below 3.8% (annual depreciation below 14.3%). The capital
income tax cut is feasible for a depreciation rate on human capital below
1.4% (annual depreciation below 5.5%), while the labor income tax cut be-
comes feasible for a depreciation rate less than 2.5% (annual depreciation
rate below 9.6%).
All the results in this section have been obtained for a zero consumption
tax. Any positive tax rate on consumption will make it easier to 1nance any
given tax cut, so the described feasible range for each structural parameter
will become wider.
In Section 4 we have shown that, for our benchmark parameterization,
the largest feasible labor income tax cut is more e#ective in terms of the
long-run growth and welfare than the largest feasible capital income tax cut.
This preference for labor income tax cuts does not change under changes in
any structural parameter other than p, the relative weight of consumption in
the utility function. Fig. 5 shows the welfare and growth e#ects of the largest
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feasible tax cuts, as a function of p. For p above 0.39 the capital income tax
cut produces a larger stimulus on growth than the labor income tax cut, while
for p above 0.35 the largest feasible tax cut on capital income produces a
larger welfare gain than the largest feasible tax cut on labor income.
6. Conclusions
We have discussed the possibility of introducing welfare improving changes
on 1scal policies being implemented in actual economies. In a model econ-
omy with the accumulation of physical and human capital and constant re-
turns to scale technologies in the production of both, the consumption good
and human capital, we have started by analyzing the extent to which debt
can substitute for taxes on labor and capital income in de1cit management.
Together with a constant relative risk aversion utility function on consump-
tion and leisure for the representative agent, this model produces endogenous
growth.
As a consequence, tax cuts on labor and capital income have a positive
e#ect on the rate of growth of the economy, thereby progressively increasing
the tax base over time. Given a time path for government expenditures, a cut
in a tax rate while keeping other taxes unchanged will have to come together
with issuing some debt. However, the positive e#ects on the tax base of a tax
cut may allow for eventually repaying the debt which was initially issued, in
which case we say that the tax cut is feasible. Feasible tax cuts satisfy the
present value government budget constraint.
We generalize Ireland (1994) by (a) considering di#erent taxes, whose
relative e#ects on welfare we can compare, (b) using a human capital ac-
cumulation economy which experiences a non-trivial transition between bal-
anced growth paths following a government intervention. This allows us to
distinguish between short- and long-run e#ects on growth, welfare, and any
variable of interest. Another related work is Pecorino (1995), who charac-
terizes the position of the peak in La#er’s curve. Alternatively, as in Ireland
(1994), we focus on a di#erent point in the curve, that corresponding to the
minimum tax rate which is able to support the exogenous stream of Govern-
ment expenditures. Since welfare is increasing in the size of a tax cut, moving
to that minimum tax rate will also lead to the largest welfare increase. At
a di#erence of these two authors, we have taken into account the transition
between balanced growth paths. The relevance of the transition arises from
the fact that impulse response functions following a policy intervention often
change their sign over time; time aggregate budget and welfare e#ects can
be substantially di#erent from the long-run e#ects.
Starting from tax rates on capital and labor income  r0 = 0:50;  
!
0 = 0:23,
similar to those used in previous work to represent US 1scal policy (as in
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Cooley and Hansen, 1992), or from  r0 = 0:50;  
!
0 = 0:30 as an alternative, we
have shown that there is a non-trivial range of feasible reductions in either tax
rate. Feasible cuts can be quite substantial, and we have shown that the ef-
fects on long-run growth and welfare are increasing in the size of the tax cut.
The exception is consumption tax cuts, which imply small long-run growth
e#ects, making it impossible to 1nance any reduction in tax rates. With
our parameterization, there are no dynamic La#er e#ects for consumption
taxes.
A reduction in labor income tax rates from our benchmark value produces a
more important stimulus on long-run growth than a similar nominal reduction
in capital income tax rates. Even though either tax cut produces an initial fall
in utility, the positive longer-term impact dominates, and the welfare e#ect
of any feasible tax cut is always positive. Furthermore, we have shown that,
from a somewhat standard 1scal stance, it can well be the case that the
welfare gain from the largest feasible cut in labor income taxes exceeds that
from the largest feasible cut in capital income taxes.
Some quali1cations need to be made on the previous results: (a) under
our parameterization, tailored to the US economy, feasible tax cuts exist only
for values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution above 0.56, i.e., for
constant relative risk aversion parameter values below 1.8, a range that ex-
cludes values which are sometimes considered in theoretical and empirical
work, (b) cuts in capital income taxes become preferable to reductions in
labor income taxes when consumption is highly preferred, relative to leisure,
by the representative agent in the economy, and (c) in an economy in which
the initial labor income tax is much smaller than that on capital income, the
largest feasible tax cut in the former, if any, might have a minimum impact
on growth and welfare, being less preferred than the largest feasible cut in
capital income tax rates.
Pecorino (1995) and Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998) have shown that
considering a market for human capital enhances the negative e#ects of factor
income taxes on growth. Besides, these authors show that the growth implica-
tions of factor income taxes depend on the tax treatment of the human capital
sector. As a consequence, the relative preference for feasible cuts on labor
or income taxes may depend on considering human capital accumulation as
a market activity. Presumably, considering the substitution of debt for taxes
in such a model would be a non-trivial and interesting complement to this
paper.
Finally, it might well be the case that simultaneous, smaller cuts in both
factor taxes could be preferred in terms of welfare to the largest feasible tax
cut on a single factor. However, analyzing that issue requires characterizing
the feasible range of tax rates on a given factor for each level of the tax rate
on the other factor, which is computationally rather demanding and we have
left for future research.
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